Summary report for Future of Nuclear seminar – Nuclear Liability Developments in India, May 27

On May 27th attendees of the Future of Nuclear seminar series had the privilege to hear Els Reynaers discuss recent nuclear liability developments in India. Specifically, the discussion focused on the practical implications for Canadian parties interested in establishing commercial exports of civil nuclear energy technology and uranium.

A review of India’s current energy mix, as well as the country’s ambitious projected energy scenarios provided context for the discussion. By 2050, India wishes to meet 25% of its electricity needs through nuclear energy, a significant increase from the roughly 2% the industry currently represents. Thanks to key international developments, specifically a 2008 exception from Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) guidelines that previously restricted the transfer of technology, it seemed India was on-route to meeting their targets with the help of foreign participation.

Nevertheless, for this union to be successful, foreign nuclear vendors, regulators, and suppliers had to navigate India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLND). It is precisely here where the challenges lie. Chief among them were issues regarding the value and time frame of supplier liability, as well as what constitutes a supplier and the right to legal recourse in the event of a nuclear incident.

In response, the recent India-US agreement represents a commitment to address the stipulations of the CLND and so encourage foreign partnerships. The recently launched India Nuclear Insurance Pool (INIP) serves this purpose by providing funds to cover both operator and supplier liability risks and thus generate investor confidence.

Towards the end of the discussion, insightful questions were brought forth that spoke of support as well as the need to delve into the details of both the CLND and INIP. For partnerships to thrive, it is key that the aforementioned challenges be addressed. While we await the finalization of the India-US agreement and INIP policies, the lines of communication between interested parties will be kept open.

Written by Alejandra Tobar, B.Sc. Candidate, University of Toronto


News Brief: Nuclear Power Developments in Argentina

Dan Yurman’s recent article for the Energy Collective sheds new light on Argentina’s recent nuclear power developments. Yurman higlights deals for three new nuclear reactors and the the country’s new R&D program focused on the development of a 25 MWe SMR based on a PWR design.

Key facts of the three new reactors include:

  • China’s CNNC is financing two of the new reactors for a total of deal worth $13 billion USD.
  • Russia’s Rosatom is partnering for the third reactor, financing $6 billion USD.
  • Despite these financing deals, Argentina will need to seek further financing, likely from international markets
  • The Chinese reactors are a 800 MW PHWR Candu type reactor scheduled for 2016, and later a new CNNC 1100 MW Hualong One reactor. Rosatom’s reactor is a 1200 MW VVER design.

Yurman also highlights the developmend of a 25 MWe SMR by CNEA (the National Atomic Energy Commission) that is positioned “to be used to supply energy for areas with small populations or, potentially, for supplying power to desalination plants in costal areas.

Nuclear Energy in Argentina

According to World Nuclear Association’s country profile, Argentina currently has three nuclear reactors generating about one-tenth of its electricity. In 2007, per capita energy consumption was over 2600 kWh/yr. In 2012, gross electicity production included 73 TWh from gas, 30 TWh from hydroelectric, 20 TWh from oil, 3 TWh from coal, and 6.4 TWh from nuclear.

Argentina’s electicity production is largely privatised, and is regulated from ENRE (Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad). Yurman, in his article on Argentina’s future nuclear energy plans, describes the three existing reactors:

the profile of installed units includes three PWHR Candu type reactors the oldest of which was built in 1974 (Atucha 1). Atucha 2, a 700 MW PHWR entered revenue service in 2014, and a third unit Embalse, a 600 MW Candu 6, was completed in 1983.

The deals with China and Russia enable a rapid shift in Argentina’s energy mix, with an increasing focus on cutting carbon emmissions. However, questions remain as to whether Argentina can afford major new nuclear infrastructure. As an April 2015 op-ed by Jason Marczak in the World Politics Review noted, Argentina is often an afterthought for investors looking to invest internationally, due to political instabilitity and the fallout from the sovereign debt default in the early 2000s.

However, with presidential elections later this year, there is renewed optimism in Argentina and, perhaps, a chance that international investors will begin to reconsider their skepticism. Renewed investment will make help to catapult the recent Chinese and Russian deals, and the local SMR development, from the early stages of today towards a brighter future.

Special Report: Nuclear Law and Liability Developments in India (Part 2 of 3)


Last week, in Part 1 of this Special Report, we explored the history of India’s nuclear law liability regime and the passing of the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act. We ended by highlighting how the 2010 Liability Act effectively drove a wedge between international suppliers and India’s nuclear industry by exposing suppliers to increased liability in the event of accidents.

Today, in Part 2, we will discuss and analyze the recent India-US agreement on nuclear trade and liability. In addition, we will canvas news reports and opinion pieces to get a sense of the reaction’s of industry experts and observers.

Part 2: The India-US Agreement

In January of this year, U.S. President Barack Obama visited India to meet with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. One of the key goals of the president’s trip was to formalize an agreement on nuclear development and liability issues.


(Image Source: Reuters via the BBC)

As a report by Dan Roberts in The Guardian notes, the threat of tough Indian compensation laws – specifically the 2010 Liability Act – had “frustrated US hopes of an export boom in the energy sector.” As of May 2015, the details of the deal are still being finalized. However, certain baseline elements are set. As this Reuters report lays out, the deal sets a framework for the US nuclear industry to enter commercial talks with India’s nuclear operators by resolving two concerns, inspections and liability.

On the issue of liability specifically, the agreement upholds the strict liability regime and the supplier liability provisions of the 2010 Liability Act. However, to address supplier concerns, India will establish an insurance pool to cover liability up to a hard cap. The insurance pool, which would be backed by the state of India, would cover operator liability of up to 15 billion rupees (around $250 million US). Any recourse sought by the operator against a supplier could not be exceed this figure. In addition, insurance premiums for suppliers would be a fraction of the amount paid by the operator of the plants.

The Reuters report also highlights that in the event of a large scale incident, the Indian government would cover additional costs up to $420 Million (US) and, for additional funds, the report says that India would need to join the IAEA Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC).

Following the India-US agreement, India has made it clear that the 2010 Liability Act will not be amended. A report from the India Express highlights the government’s position that

the foreign suppliers of the reactors cannot be sued for the damages by victims of a nuclear accident but can be held liable by the operator who has the right of recourse that could be operationalised through the contract between the operator and the supplier.

As a result, the agreement should not be viewed as a reform of India’s liability laws, but as an agreement to work within those laws by establishing an insurance pool for the operators and suppliers. In retrospect, it is clear that it was very important that India maintain its liability regime, as public and political opinion favoured increased liability for foreign suppliers following the Bhopal disaster in 1984. The agreement thus establishes a mechanism that keeps this regime in place while allowing for increased international nuclear trade.

Reactions to the Agreement and Concluding Thoughts

Reactions to the agreement have been mixed in the ensuing days and months. Partly, this is due to the fact that many of the details of the insurance pool have yet to be finalized. In an interview with Germany’s Deutsche Welle (DW), Mycle Schneider, an independent international consultant on energy and nuclear policy, shared concerns about the deal;

apparently, no specific document was signed. The Indian government reportedly announced its plan to set up a 122 million USD insurance fund to cover operators and suppliers from liabilities in case of an accident. Senior US nuclear industry officials stated they need to understand the “fine print” of the insurance. Equipment suppliers are keeping the champagne on ice, as one Indian business journal commented.

Mr. Scheinder, when asked if he expects the Indian market to become more appealing for US companies, says that “there is no real market for foreign companies in India, unless they bring their own funding. Under free market condition, it is not possible anymore to build a nuclear power plant anywhere in the world.”

A recent article on Monday by Ran Chakrabarti, an Indian lawyer, echoes similar skepticism.

It remains to be seen whether the Act and the Rules set out a balanced framework, encouraging suppliers to dip their toes into the Indian nuclear energy market, yet protecting the legitimate interests and concerns of the public in the event of a nuclear accident.

Given the complexity of nuclear development and the liability regime in India, it’s clear that this agreement will not be a panacea for all of the industry’s problems. As we’ve seen in these criticisms, and throughout India’s history, the role of foreign companies and governments in trade and development has been at times troublesome and, at other times, even disastrous.

However, India is growing at incredible rates and, as we explored in Part 1, lacks access to domestic energy resources such as coal and oil (which have driven China’s much faster economic growth). As a result, nuclear energy can help provide for a better base capacity for the country as it continues to also develop renewables such as wind and solar. In Part 3, to be published in the coming weeks, we will explore the future of nuclear in India and also focus on the ongoing finalization of the US-India agreement.

News in Depth: Deploying SMR Technology in Canada’s Northern Communities

In mid-April, 2015, Peter Lang, President of Dunedin Energy Systems Ltd, gave a presentation at the Nunavut Mining Symposium, arguing for a radical shift in the way we provide energy to remote communities and mining operations. Traditionally, northern communities have relied upon diesel generators that produce substantial pollution and require costly infrastructure for fuel transport to maintain energy production.

Lang suggests a new approach, one that utilizes new, small modular reactor (SMR) technology to produce energy from floating nuclear power ships. In this week’s News in Depth, we explore Lang’s idea and the potential opportunities and challenges that are ahead.

An Old Idea Given New Life

As Lang noted in his presentation, the idea of utilizing nuclear reactors in unique contexts is not new: small, self-contained nuclear reactors have been providing energy on military ships and submarines (103 in the US Navy alone), and ice-breakers for decades and have been deployed in northern Russian communities since the 1970s.

Lang’s Dunedin Energy believes that their SMART (Small Modular Adaptable Reactor Technology) system would provide a more sustainable and consistent energy source for remote communities in Canada. They describe the systems as a “nuclear battery”:

When the fuel in a nuclear battery is consumed, the entire reactor module (which contains the spent fuel) is removed and shipped to a processing facility for fuel recycling. A new, freshly fuelled reactor module is installed to replace it. The reactor module is a sealed unit and cannot be opened for any reason at the operating site.

In his presentation, Lang compares diesel and nuclear, using a 16MWe common production rate. Notably, the annual fuel logistics of diesel include moving and storing over 31 million litres of fuel and annual greenhouse gas emissions are estimated to be 85,000 tonnes. Compare those figures to the zero fuel logistics and greenhouse gas emissions of their nuclear SMART system. Lang also highlights the issue of carbon taxes, arguing that while diesel may cost up to $1.2 Million for a 16MWe plant, a nuclear SMART reactor would gain a credit of $1.2 Million.

The Challenges Ahead

The incredibly favourable comparison above belies some of the deeper challenges that SMR development may face in northern communities.

The first set of challenges relate to cost and public resistance. Dunedin presents two business cases – a full-ownership option and a “zero-capital cost” option wherein Dunedin handles the operation and logistics of deployment, operation, and decommissioning, and the customer pays approximately 29 cents/kW in return.

However, northern communities and mine operators may be tempted to continue to rely on diesel – owing to the current low price of oil and, in essence, because of the stickiness of the status quo. In addition, northern communities, including many Aboriginal groups, continue to be locked in debates over energy development, mining, and socio-economic development; introducing any new nuclear energy plan may provide more fodder for political debate. Dunedin appears to be aware of these challenges and addresses the regulatory and safety issues on their website. However, as we suggested in a piece on April 23, better public engagement and education would be required to quell any genuine fears or uncertainty that exist.

Lastly, northern communities may demand a clearer set of guidelines and regulations relating to decommissioning and remediation. Lang noted in his presentation that decommissioning funds would be held in escrow, effectively guaranteeing that even if a community or mine is bankrupt, that the money for cleanup and restoration is not subject to claims by creditors or other parties. Dunedin’s approach is unique – in that the whole reactor-in-a-ship concept allows for relatively easy site cleanup – but questions still remain. How much would be necessary for cleanup? What does full restoration look like?

In other words, this ambitious idea is not without issues. However, there appear to be tremendous economic and environmental arguments in favour of SMR development in northern and remote communities. These arguments carry over to other contexts – including Mexico, for example – and may one day translate to a new energy future for Canada’s North.

News in Depth: Germany’s Nuclear Phase Out

This week, German electric utitlity company RWE’s Chief Executive, Peter Terium, criticised the German government’s plans for imposing a levy on older fossil-fuelled power plants. Terium, in a shareholder meeting, argued that such a move to tax lignite based plants would lead to job losses and soaring electicity prices at a time when Germany is both trying to maintain economic growth and phase out its nuclear energy capacity by 2022.

This latest news follows a larger pattern of increasing German reliance on fossil-fuels as the country seeks to move away from nuclear – which once provided 25 percent of the country’s electricity – while also maintaining a energy-cost structure that allows Germany’s industrial base to remain competitive.

In this week’s News in Depth, we explore the story of Germany’s National Energy Transition Plan (Energiewende) and ask what lessons can be learned from a relatively rapid and unprecedented shift away from nuclear energy.

The Story So Far

As the World Nuclear Association’s fact-sheet points out, Germany first announced a plan to phase out nuclear energy in the wake of the 1998 federal elections. The plan was abandoned in 2009 following the election of a new government.

However, on May 30, 2011, Angela Merkel’s government announced a new plan to phase out nuclear energy by 2022, in response to widespread public protests following the Fukushima-Daichi crisis in Japan. The plan, estimated to cost almost 1 trillion euros, was announced by then Environmental Minister Norbert Rottgen. The initial plan was that:

the seven oldest reactors – which were taken offline for a safety review immediately after the Japanese crisis – would never be used again. An eighth plant – the Kruemmel facility in northern Germany… would also be shut down for good. Six others would go offline by 2021 at the latest and the three newest plants by 2022.

At the time of the announcement, the plan was citicized by other political parties and industry leaders. Renate Künast, the co-floor leader of the Green Party, expressed doubt as to the government’s level of prepardness to make the switch to renewables – leading to concerns that such a move would be a step back in terms of cutting carbon emmissions. In addition, Daimler CEO Dieter Zetsche suggested that the plan presented a “number of risks” to Germany’s manufacturing sectore.

Fast forward to 2014, when Robert Wilson, writing for the Energy Collective, points out that Germany’s nuclear phase is out leading to more coal burning. As he argues, the energy transition is not necessarily a positive one in terms of cutting carbon emissions; between “2011 and 2015 Germany will open 10.7 GW of new coal fired power stations.” These new plants, as he points out, are not directly tied to the 2011 announcement, but they are a result of Germany’s first foray into nuclear phase out in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The Story Today, and Tomorrow

Wilson’s point, then, is that Germany’s growing reliance on coal is real, but it is not simply a result of the 2011 phase out plan. For some time, Germany has been moving away from nuclear. Thus, the move is not purely ideological or politically driven. However, it is also not, in light of the tariff and emmissions issues, a totally practical decision. The question remains, can Germany succesfully pull off a relatively rapid phase out while maintaining a strong and cost-effective energy system to support its manufacturing sector? Can it also do so while cutting carbon emmissions?

Raimund Bleishwitz, a professor at Univeristy College London, is cited in Scientific American as framing the issue in two ways: 1) external competition, and 2) internal burden sharing. Bleishwitz’s taxonomy, which highlights the tensions inherent in a large scale energy transition, is a useful tool for thinking about energy development more broadly.

While nuclear energy’s future in Germany is uncertain today, it’s clear that many other countries, especially developing nations, are looking to nuclear energy to develop a more robust, consistent, and flexible energy supply for their growing economies. Germany provides a counter-example to these efforts, remininding us that energy needs, market dynamics, and political climates change over time. We must remain open to these changes, and be ready to anticipate what may come next.

News in Depth: Nuclear Energy and Mexico’s Radical Quest to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emmisions

Mexico’s Bold Emissions Goals

On Friday, March 27, 2015, the Government of Mexico announced new targets that aim to cut output of greenhouse gases by 22 percent and its emissions of black carbon and soot by 51 percent by the year 2030. Such a move would make 2026 its peak emissions year.

While Mexico is only responsible for an estimated 1.5% of global emissions, the country felt strongly that is was important to set the goals high and to set them early in the lead up the global climate conference in Paris in December. Roberto Dondisch Glowinski, Mexico’s lead negotiator to the United Nations (U.N.) climate talks, is quoted in Scientific American saying: “we are trying to show that what we say in the negotiations, we stand by our words. Second, we want to show that it is feasible.”

How does Mexico plan to meet these targets? Steven Mufson, writer for the Washington Post, notes that meeting these goals will require higher fuel efficiency standard for cars and an increasing of investment in renewable and nuclear energy for the power sector.

The Future of Nuclear in Mexico

As the World Nuclear Association (WNA) highlights, Mexico currently operates two nuclear reactors that generate approximately 4 percent of its electricity. The country is also a net energy exporter, as it is rich in fossil fuel resources such as oil and natural gas. As the WNA notes, there is political will to further develop nuclear capacity, but the recent drop in oil prices has stymied any significant progress.

Given these new targets, Mexico’s Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) may pursue an earlier strategy which included building six to eight 1400 MWe units and, potentially, more flexible and less cost-intensive Small Modular Reactors (SMR) that could service the agricultural sector. However, putting these plans into action will require new investments in education and training.

In January 2015, ScienceDaily featured the research of Dr. Lorenzo Martínez Gómez, a researcher at the Institute of Physics of the Autonomous Nacional University of Mexico (UNAM). Dr. Gómez’s argues that nuclear energy is key to mitigating climate change and to reducing fossil fuel use in Mexico. The article summarizes Dr. Gómez’s main points, including: 1) that the public in Mexico fears nuclear, despite fossil fuels inflicting more actual damage to the environment and to public safety, and 2) that the key to the success of nuclear in Mexico will be training and education of scientists and technicians.

The federal government manages employment opportunities that will be generated by energy reform efforts (about 135,000 in total) not only in areas of hydrocarbons, but new technologies to develop alternative energy. Given the government’s investment in training, Mr. Gómez argues that now is the time to spark a revival in nuclear engineering in Mexico.

In short, it’s likely that the nuclear sector can play a big role in helping Mexico achieve its new emissions goals by leveraging investments in training and education and by capitalizing on new found political will both at home and abroad. Significant progress is hard to predict in the short term, but we’re optimistic that the global climate change conference in December may provide the necessary spark to push the government of Mexico and its partners into action.

News in Depth: Japan’s Shift Towards Fossil Fuels Raises New Questions about Emissions and Nuclear Investment


The Wall Street Journal recently reported on Japan’s increasing investment in coal, oil, and natural gas as the country strains to produce enough electricity following the idling of all nuclear plants in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster in March of 2011.

Japan’s embrace of fossil fuels has a number of implications, most notably the pressure on emissions standards and on medium and long term investments in nuclear and renewable energy sources more broadly. In this week’s News in Depth feature, we explore Japan’s recent moves with respect to fossil fuels and the impact those moves have on emissions and strategies for energy infrastructure investment.

The Low Price of Oil and it’s Impact on Japan’s Energy Sector

As of writing, Oil is priced at ($53.44 for Brent Crude), reflecting a downward trend that began in 2014.

Crude Oil 6 Month Price Trend

Goldman Sachs analysts suggest that we may see the price of U.S. crude drop as far as $40 a barrel in the near-term, as inventories begin to rise.

While we continue to forecast a strong demand recovery in 2015, we believe that sequentially weaker activity, the end of winter and the end of potential restocking demand, will lead to a sequential deceleration in demand-growth as we enter the spring.

These prices, in addition to low coal and natural gas prices, have had a major impact on Japan as it seeks to fill the capacity void left by its 48 idled nuclear plants. Japan brought 14 new gas and coal-fired power plants online by the end of 2014 alone. It’s also been reported that by the end of 2025, Japan hopes to have a total capacity of over 13GW of new coal generation.

Reactions to this shift towards oil, coal, and gas have been mixed. There are clear political and economic advantages to Japan’s diversification. Perhaps most importantly, reliance on the cheaper fossil fuels will help Japan ease it’s energy import bill. In the first half of 2014, Japan’s trade gap reached 4.8 trillion yen. Moves to these cheaper energy sources are projected to lower that deficit and to ease pressure on and lower costs for Japan’s economy and manufacturing sector.

However, with Japan being the world’s fifth-biggest emitter of carbon dioxide, concerns have been raised about its increasing reliance of fossil fuels. Aaron Sheldrick, reporting for the Japan Times, writes that Japan is seeing increasing pressure from other countries, including China and the US, to meet it’s emission targets.

Balancing Short Term and Long Term Energy Investments

While the situation in Japan reflects many unique factors, including the Fukushima disaster and the public distrust of nuclear energy, it also provides a number of interesting angles of analysis. There is the broader phenomena of cheap oil and fossil fuels. However, the concerns highlighted above, including climate change and the regulation of carbon emissions, highlight the importance of keeping a longer term view on energy infrastructure investment. Moreover, it is important to consider the balance of an interest in highly elastic and less capital intensive energy sources, such as fossil fuels, with an interest in longer term infrastructure investments, such as nuclear, that pollute less and provide for greater supply certainty for growing economies.

For more on these issues, listen to The Bulletin with UBS podcast by Monocle, which this weeks focuses on global investment strategies in the oil sector. For further reference and cost comparisons between different energy sources, see also The Economics of Nuclear Power.

Breakthrough deal for Candu and China Nuclear to build two reactors in Romania

Candu Energy and China Nuclear Power Engineering Company Sign Cooperation Agreement for Two CANDU Reactors in Romania

MISSISSAUGA, ONJuly 24, 2014 /CNW/ – Candu Energy Inc., an SNC-Lavalin company, today signed a binding and exclusive cooperation agreement with China Nuclear Power Engineering Company, Ltd. (CNPEC) for the construction of CANDU Units 3 and 4 at the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant in Romania.  Signed in Vancouver, the agreement was witnessed by senior representatives of China’s National Energy Administration and Natural Resources Canada.

Romania already has two operating CANDU 6 nuclear reactors, which came into service in 1996 and 2007. Combined, they are the largest power producer in the country, accounting for about 20 per cent of Romania’s energy supply. This agreement follows a letter of intent signed by CNPEC’s parent company China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) and Romanian utility Societatea Nationala Nuclearelectrica (SNN) in November 2013 for investment in and development of two additional nuclear units at the Cernavoda site.

“Candu Energy looks forward to working with CNPEC to meet Romania’s growing nuclear energy requirements.  This is an exciting opportunity to build on CANDU technology’s international track record for the highest levels of safety, reliability and efficiency,” said Preston Swafford, Candu Energy President and CEO.  “Today’s agreement deepens our strong ties with both the Romanian and Chinese nuclear industries, as CANDU reactors have operated in both countries for more than a decade.”

CANDU nuclear technology has an established presence in China, with two 700 megawatt CANDU reactors at Qinshan Phase III, located southwest of Shanghai. Completed in 2003, the Qinshan units are among the best performing nuclear units in China with lifetime capacity factors of over 91 per cent.

“This project stands to make a meaningful contribution to Canada’s economy and support highly-skilled jobs here at home.  It demonstrates the tremendous export value of Canadian nuclear expertise,” added Mr. Swafford.

Candu Energy is pursuing other international new build opportunities in the United Kingdom and China, among other markets.

About Candu Energy Inc.

Candu Energy Inc. is a leading full-service nuclear technology company providing nuclear power reactors and nuclear products and services to customers worldwide. Candu Energy’s 1,200 highly skilled employees design and deliver state-of-the-art CANDU® reactors, carry out life extension projects, and offer operations, maintenance and plant life management services for existing nuclear power stations.

CANDU reactors use natural uranium fuel, heavy-water moderator and heavy-water coolant in a pressure tube design. They can be refuelled on power and have one of the highest lifetime capacity factors among the world’s reactors. CANDU reactors are ideal for small and medium electric grids; the newest designs are equipped with a number of safety enhancements to meet the latest Canadian and international standards, including post-Fukushima enhancements. They benefit from the CANDU 6 experience of proven design, construction and operation.

Nuclear Innovation announced as theme for Future of Nuclear 2014 Conference

In recent weeks, sources as diverse as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times and the Dalai Lama have all commented on the relentless growth of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the earth’s atmosphere and the need to mitigate resultant climate change effects.  In all instances the sources have talked about the need for nuclear energy to play an increased role in the global energy mix.  Along with renewable forms of energy such as wind and solar, together with innovations in smart grid and energy storage, leading thinkers believe there still may be a chance to rein in overall global warming before certain irreversible tipping points are reached.

In our post-Fukushima world many leading policy makers, politicians, and stakeholders are revisiting and reassessing the role that nuclear power can play in the global energy mix. What innovations have taken place since the Fukushima generation reactors were designed and deployed?  What innovations have there been in safety, regulation, and decommissioning?  Have there been advances in quantifying the risks and liabilities of nuclear projects?  What are the innovations and considerations in public policy, education and awareness that have prompted several jurisdictions to ramp up their nuclear programs?

On November 4, 2014, Mindfirst will host the second Future of Nuclear Conference that will address many of these questions. We are currently in the process of developing the agenda, content and speaker list.  Interested participants and potential speakers may contact  Click here to view the agenda from last year’s Future of Nuclear conference.

Early bird registration is available at:




Topic announced for Future of Nuclear Seminar #3 – Nuclear Energy Finance: the UK Experience

On May 8, 2014, Jonathan Dart, Consul General at the British Consulate in Toronto, will speak about the UK’s recent experience in nuclear energy finance and lessons that can be learned.  Below is the abstract for the event:

“Financing nuclear energy projects has become increasingly complex in recent years. The potential for projects going over budget and difficulty in quantifying project risk contribute to financing complexity and cost. The large capital requirements in nuclear energy projects have typically required that national governments become involved in order to guarantee payments or backstop projects. In many jurisdictions the high level of complexity have made nuclear projects prohibitively expensive. Coupled with negative public sentiment towards nuclear energy there has been a decline in nuclear power useage in several Western economies. Concurrently, there are numerous countries such as China and India, that are ramping up their nuclear energy capabilities. In the United Kingdom, after years of decline in nuclear energy the government has decided to proceed with building a new reactor. How was this financed? What changed in the eyes of policy makers that they decided to proceed with new nuclear? Is there an opportunity for Canadian funds and investment bankers to participate in the large nuclear projects that will be deployed globally?”

Click here to learn more and to register.